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A new framework for animal-
behaviour research will help 
to avoid sampling bias — ten 
years on from the call to 
widen the pool of human 
participants in psychology 
studies beyond the WEIRD.
How STRANGE are 
your study animals?
Michael M. Webster & Christian Rutz
A common raven (Corvus corax) engages with an experimental task that is mounted above the ground.
Ten years ago this week, researchers pointed out that many important find-ings in human experimental psychol-ogy cannot be generalized because study participants are predominantly 
drawn from a small, unrepresentative sub-
set of the world’s population: societies 
that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
and enable potential biases to be declared 
and discussed when publishing completed 
work.
WEIRD humans
In June 2010, human-evolutionary biologist 
Joe Henrich and his co-authors published a 
landmark paper challenging the widely held 
assumption that human behaviour varies little 
across populations1. They highlighted that the 
vast majority of research on human behaviour, 
and its cognitive basis, was conducted using 
participants from societies who are often out-
liers in broader comparisons. For example, 
WEIRD people are unusual in how they find 
their way around, what they consider to be fair, 
and their willingness to punish others1.
Several research fields chart the behaviour 
of non-human animals, including com-
parative psychology, ethology, behav-












Rich and Democratic (WEIRD)1. Mounting 
evidence suggests that there could be similar 
sampling problems in research on animals. 
Behavioural studies of a wide range of spe-
cies — from insects to primates — could be 
affected, with researchers testing individ-
uals that are not fully representative of the 
wider populations they seek to understand. 
For example, certain sampling protocols are 
likely to trap the boldest animals, potentially 
skewing experimental results2.
It is high time for scientists who work on 
animal behaviour to identify, and mitigate, 
potential sampling biases. Simply gathering 
more data is not a solution, because research-
ers should always strive to minimize the num-
ber of experimental animals used. Instead, 
we propose a framework with a fitting acro-
nym — STRANGE — that researchers can use to 
interrogate how unusual their study subjects 
are. This will aid the design of new studies, 
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conservation science. They attempt to 
uncover the evolutionary origins, develop-
mental pathways, adaptive function, under-
lying mechanisms and conservation relevance 
of a wide variety of behaviours. Their common 
goal is to identify general biological principles 
that apply within and across taxa. Many animal 
studies are susceptible to sampling biases.
STRANGE framework
One well-known source of bias is the excessive 
reliance in some research fields on a few model 
organisms3, such as fruit flies (Drosophila spp.) 
and laboratory mice (Mus musculus), which 
inevitably limits the generality of findings. Less 
obvious, but perhaps much more problematic, 
is the fact that many species exhibit substantial 
variation in behaviour, and only certain subsets 
of that diversity might (unintentionally) turn 
up in test samples. In primates, for example, 
individuals of particular ‘personalities’ can be 
more likely to take part in trials voluntarily4 
(see ‘Beware of STRANGE’). Life-long partic-
ipation in experiments can also significantly 
alter subjects’ natural behaviour. 
When developing the framework, our start-
ing observation was that an animal’s behaviour 
is shaped5 by its genetic make-up, experience 
and social background. Ensuring that sub-
jects are representative with regards to these 
three factors is paramount. Adding a few 
specific effects, which are well-documented 
yet often overlooked, provides the acronym 
STRANGE. It stands for: Social background; 
Trappability and self-selection; Rearing his-
tory; Acclimation and habituation; Natural 
changes in responsiveness; Genetic make-up; 
and Experience. STRANGE-related biases can 
affect both laboratory and field studies. They 
can influence which animals are sampled for 
testing, the extent to which they participate in 
experiments and, importantly, the behaviours 
that they exhibit during trials. This, in turn, 
can complicate comparisons between studies, 
hampering both the generalizability and the 
reproducibility of findings.
Our approach uses a simple test to evalu-
ate the robustness of a completed or planned 
study. Researchers should ask: are my animal 
subjects strange when compared to the wider 
population for which I wish to make infer-
ences, in any of the seven categories of the 
framework? Here, using selected examples, 
we showcase how sampling biases could affect 
the behaviours observed in animal studies (for 
further examples, see ‘Beware of STRANGE’ 
and Supplementary Information, Table S1).
Social background. This includes an 
animal’s social status, the nature and frequency 
of its interactions with others, and its past 
opportunities to learn socially from other indi-
viduals or their products. For example, when 
pheasants (Phasianus colchicus) were given 
a spatial-discrimination task to learn which 
of two holes contained bait, they performed 
better when they had been housed in groups 
of five rather than in groups of three6.
Trappability and self-selection. These are 
closely related processes. They mean that 
individuals with particular traits2 are most 
likely to be caught or to participate voluntar-
ily in experiments (see ‘Beware of STRANGE’). 
In a classic study on pumpkinseed sunfish 
(Lepomis gibbosus), individuals collected 
using funnel traps (into which fish have to 
actively swim) were faster to start eating in 
the laboratory compared with those trapped 
using more indiscriminate nets7. 
Trappability effects are expected to be 
prominent in bio-logging studies in which ani-
mals are fitted with electronic tags for remote 
observation. For example, when researchers 
tag surfacing whales or seabirds in breeding 
colonies that are difficult to access, they might 
inadvertently obtain non-random samples. 
Self-selection biases are a well-known — but 
usually neglected — problem in laboratory and 
field studies of animal cognition4. 
Rearing history. This describes an ani-
mal’s developmental experiences, including 
the extent to which it has been exposed to a 
stimulating physical environment, to other 
animals and to humans. One study showed that 
captive-reared jumping spiders (Phidippus 
audax) were less active, less exploratory and 
had reduced interest in prey than were those 
collected from the wild8. Exposure to enrich-
ment, social stimulation and exercise during 
development can affect brain development 
and, in turn, cognitive and motor perfor-
mance9. This relationship is well established 
BEWARE OF STRANGE
Many factors can aect animal behaviour, as these examples show, with their STRANGE category acronyms in 
brackets (the studies shown explicitly set out to examine these eects). Problems arise when test samples are 
biased with regards to these categories, and when researchers do not account for this.
Experience and timing influence sociality (E, N)
Origin and acclimation aect activity (G, A)
Social contact induces ‘optimism’ (S, R)
Self-selection varies with personality (T)
Distance travelled (millimetres; mean ± s.e.m.)
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*s.d., standard deviation; s.e.m, standard error of the mean.
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Domestic canaries (Serinus canaria) approached an unpredictable food source faster after being housed in pairs19. 
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Capuchins (Sapajus apella) that were more open and less assertive were more likely to take part in experiments4.
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for rats and mice10.
Acclimation and habituation. These refer 
to behavioural changes over time following 
handling, tagging or exposure to new test-
ing situations. For instance, green turtles 
(Chelonia mydas) spent less time swimming 
and more time feeding the day after they were 
tagged with video cameras than they did on 
the day of tagging. This probably reflects the 
turtles’ recovery from the tagging procedure 
and their habituation to the cameras11.
Natural changes in responsiveness. These 
sometimes follow daily, reproductive or sea-
sonal cycles, or the transition from one life 
stage to another. This means that the timing 
of experiments is often crucial, as highlighted 
by a study that found that honeybees (Apis 
mellifera) learn more effectively in the morn-
ing than at other times of the day12.
Genetic make-up. This can have profound 
effects on behaviour. For example, the experi-
ence of losing territorial fights early in life has 
different effects in wild-type brown rats (Rattus 
norvegicus) than in individuals from a common 
genetic strain. The laboratory rats end up 
spending less time investigating intruders as 
adults13. There can also be marked differences 
in behaviour between wild populations, and 
between males and females, as has been shown 
in an experimental study on anti-predator 
behaviour in Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia 
reticulata), in which females spent more time 
shoaling than did males, for instance14. 
E x p e r i e n c e .  T h i s  e n c o m p a s s e s 
opportunities for individual learning, such 
as participation in earlier experiments. (This 
means there can be overlap with some of the 
other framework categories.) After male chaf-
finches (Fringilla coelebs) had been lured by a 
playback of a rival’s song, captured, handled 
and released again, they sang fewer territorial 
songs in response to simulated territory 
intrusions than did birds that had not been 
captured15. Long-lived animals can accumulate 
complex experimental histories in research 
laboratories, which in our view must be better 
documented and accounted for.
Crucial considerations
Some general points about the framework are 
worth highlighting. First, there are important 
conceptual differences between WEIRD and 
STRANGE. The former identifies attributes 
of a particular demographic group; the lat-
ter refers to a suite of factors that can affect 
behaviour. The seven categories of STRANGE 
are not problematic by themselves. In fact, 
they are often the focus of well-designed 
research projects, such as those we mention 
here, or are confounding factors that have 
been explicitly controlled for. Concerns 
arise whenever samples of study subjects are 
unwittingly biased with regards to any of these 
categories, and when researchers overlook 
that fact.
Second, there is overlap and strong 
interdependence between some STRANGE cat-
egories. For example, the origin of an animal 
— whether it was wild-caught or captive-bred 
— will often simultaneously affect its genetic 
make-up, social background, experience and 
rearing history. Third, we designed the cate-
gories to be broad enough to accommodate 
future extensions. Finally, although STRANGE 
refers to samples of animal subjects, effects 
can be moderated by study protocols. For 
instance, depending on the species, testing 
with or without others present can signifi-
cantly affect an animal’s willingness to par-
ticipate, as often observed in fish, birds and 
primates. 
What will our critics say? Some might note 
that several of the effects we discuss — such 
as self-selection and experience biases — 
have been highlighted as problematic in the 
past. We feel that, because research practice 
seems to have improved little in response 
to specific warnings, it is time to introduce 
a memorable framework that integrates all 
factors that could affect the generalizability 
of animal-behaviour studies.
Others might point out that most of the 
examples we mention simply illustrate driv-
ers of behavioural variation, and not sampling 
bias. As we will explain, systematic studies are 












“Concerns arise whenever 
samples of study subjects 
are unwittingly biased.”
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urgently required to assess our contention 
that the potential for bias is both widespread 
and routinely ignored.
3D reproducibility
It is possible to identify and mitigate 
STRANGE-related biases at little or no extra 
cost, with a simple ‘3D’ approach: design, 
declare, discuss (see also Supplementary 
information, Box S1).
Design. There are many opportunities for 
researchers to make their test samples more 
representative (see Box S1, step 1). For exam-
ple, we recommend that projects that rely on 
trapping wild subjects consider using a variety 
of trap types or bait preparations. They can 
also sample across multiple populations to 
reduce systematic biases. Similarly, in studies 
in which animals effectively select themselves 
for participation, we encourage researchers to 
think about ways of altering the testing envi-
ronment or the task itself, to encourage more 
inclusive participation. Anecdotal evidence 
reveals that some crows, for instance, are hes-
itant to approach experimental tasks that are 
placed on the floor, but will readily engage with 
them when they are mounted just one metre 
above the ground. 
Declare. When submitting a manuscript, 
researchers should supply — and journals should 
ask for — an objective evaluation of a system’s 
‘STRANGEness’ so that editors and reviewers can 
gauge the scope for bias. Although reporting 
standards have significantly improved over the 
past few years, a surprising number of journals 
— including many specializing in animal behav-
iour and cognition — still lack robust reporting 
policies. We urge journals to insist that all behav-
ioural studies report detailed subject-attribute 
data as set out in the ARRIVE guidelines (Animal 
Research: Reporting of In Vivo Experiments)16, 
with some additions (such as a full declaration 
of the attributes of non-participating subjects; 
see Box S1, step 2a).
Our STRANGE framework can then be used 
together with this information to evaluate the 
scope for sampling biases (Box S1, step 2b), 
and to describe which precautionary steps 
were taken to avoid bias, if any (Box S1, step 2c). 
These declarations enhance transparency, pro-
vide a valuable resource for systematic reviews 
and formal meta-analyses, and will hopefully 
encourage better planning of future studies.
Discuss. It is essential to detail any poten-
tial issues prominently in the main body of 
research papers (Box S1, step 3). This would 
force authors to explicitly link their findings 
to the studied sample, rather than to the pop-
ulation or species as a whole17.
As well as supporting all steps of this 3D 
approach, STRANGE provides a convenient 
memory aid: we encourage animal-behaviour 
researchers to routinely ask how unusual their 
samples are. (For further questions about 
specific categories, see Table S1.)
Next steps
There is a large body of literature demonstrat-
ing how the categories in our STRANGE frame-
work can affect the behaviours researchers 
observe. On the basis of this evidence, our 
personal research experience and our discus-
sions with many colleagues, we suspect that 
STRANGE-related problems are widespread. 
We now urgently need retrospective analyses 
of published work that quantify how often test 
samples are biased with regards to these cat-
egories, when researchers failed to account 
for — or declare — these confounding factors. 
Human experimental psychology has made 
great strides towards addressing sampling 
biases by improving reporting standards. For 
example, the Association for Psychological 
Science recommends that authors identify the 
participant population, explain their selection 
and consider how generalizable their findings 
are. However, despite these efforts, problems 
are surprisingly persistent, with many pub-
lished studies still providing insufficient detail 
about their participants17.
Animal-behaviour scientists have a lot to 
learn from the WEIRD debate. We hope that 
our STRANGE framework will help to improve 
how animal-behaviour research is conducted, 
reported and interpreted. 
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Sampling biases can affect research on model organisms, such as fruit flies. 
“We encourage animal-
behaviour researchers to 
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Social background includes an 
animal’s social status, the nature and 
frequency of its social interactions, and 
its past access to social-learning 
opportunities. 
 
 Does the test sample of subjects have an unusual social 
background? 
 What is the social rank of the subjects? Could this affect 
participation in experiments? 
 Are subjects housed alone or in groups? If in groups, of 
what size? 
 Are subjects tested alone or in the presence of other 
animals? Are testing conditions adapted for non-
participating subjects? 
 What social experiences did subjects have prior to testing 
(e.g., of aggression, courtship, or mating)? 
 Could subjects have previously acquired information via 
social learning that affects their test performance? 
 
 
 Social rank affected innovation in chimpanzees21. 
 Dominance rank positively correlated with cognitive 
performance in starlings22. 
 Rearing density affected social information use and 
shoaling in guppies23. 
 Mating experience influenced courtship and mate 
competition in fruit flies24. 
 Social dominance interacted with social rearing 
condition to shape boldness and aggressiveness in 
skinks25. 
 Spatial discrimination ability positively correlated with 
social rank in male pheasants26. 
 Natural group size was positively correlated with 
cognitive performance in Australian magpies27–29. 
 
 
Trappability and self-selection are 
closely related processes that result, 
respectively, in individuals with certain 
characteristics (such as particular 
‘personality’ types) being more likely to 
be trapped, or to participate voluntarily 
in experiments. Trappability effects are 
expected to be prominent in bio-logging 
studies where subjects are fitted with 
electronic tags for remote observation, 
while self-selection biases are a well-
known – but usually neglected – 
problem in laboratory and field studies 
of animal cognition. 
 
 If animals are collected using traps, could this introduce 
sampling bias (e.g., by targeting bolder, more active, or 
hungrier individuals)? 
 Are different trapping methods used to avoid bias (e.g., 
different trap types, bait preparations, or trap placement 
strategies)? 
 If a self-selecting experimental design is used, do all 
potential subjects participate? What are the attributes of 
the non-participating subjects? 
 Can you rule out systematic bias in participation (e.g., by 
social rank, or personality type)? 
 Are test conditions adjusted to allow participation of 
otherwise excluded subjects (e.g., by amending the set-up 
or testing environment)? 
 
 Trappability of badgers varied between study sites, age 
and season30. 
 More exploratory and risk-taking flycatchers were 
more likely to enter traps31. 
 Bolder agamas entered traps sooner than shyer ones32. 
 Faster growing trout were more likely to be captured in 
nets33. 
 Faster exploring great tits were more likely to enter 
camera-equipped nest boxes34. 
 Pheasant chicks’ self-selection in experiments varied 
with sex, condition, personality and experience35. 
 Self-selected participation in experiments was 




 Sex, condition, and trap type affected trappability and 
trap-happiness of lampreys37. 
 
 
Rearing history describes an animal’s 
developmental experiences, including 
the extent to which it has been exposed 
to a stimulating physical environment, 
other animals, and humans. Exposure to 
enrichment, social stimulation and 
exercise during development can affect 
brain development, and in turn, 
cognitive and motor performance. 
 
 Does the test sample of subjects have an unusual rearing 
history? 
 What is known about the origin of the subjects? Are they 
collected from the wild or captive-bred? 
 If captive-bred, were they raised by their parents (in 
species with parental care), by unrelated conspecifics, or 
by humans? 
 To what extent are subjects habituated to humans and 
testing environments? 
 To what extent have subjects experienced physical 
enrichment? 
 Are subjects housed alone or in groups? 
 If housed in groups, to what extent are these similar in 
size and composition to the groups these animals live in 
in nature? 
 Are differences in subjects’ rearing history accounted 
for? 
 
 Female fruit flies reared alone were more aggressive38. 
 Male fruit flies from enriched environments had 
greater mating success39. 
 Enrichment enhanced spatial memory in mice40. 
 Hand-reared cranes were less vigilant than those 
reared by parents41. 
 Environmental variability promoted behavioural 
flexibility in cod42. 
 Environmental enrichment reduced habituation and 
problem-solving times in rattlesnakes43. 
 Enculturation affected tool-use performance in 
chimpanzees44. 
 Environmental enrichment was associated with 
‘optimistic’ response biases in starlings45. 
 Environmentally-enriched salmon took fewer risks46. 




Acclimation and habituation can 
result in behavioural changes over time, 
following handling, tagging, or exposure 
to novel testing situations. 
 
 Is the test sample of subjects unusual with regards to 
acclimation and habituation? 
 Could the behaviour of subjects be affected by the 
presence of a human observer? 
 Could the behaviour of subjects be affected by the 
presence of experimental equipment? 
 Do subjects have sufficient time to acclimate to captivity, 
and is acclimation time standardized? 
 Do all subjects acclimate to experimental conditions at 
the same rate? 
 
 Habituation to human observers reduced defensive 
behaviour over a period of days in Magellanic 
penguins48. 
 Ravens habituated to different modes of gaze following 
at different rates49. 
 Human observer presence reduced feeding and other 
behaviours in unhabituated baboons and macaques50. 
 Behaviour of damselfish took two days to stabilize after 
being brought into captivity51. 
 Reef fish gradually acclimated to the presence of 
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cameras, but not to human observers52. 
 
 
Natural changes in responsiveness 
sometimes follow daily, reproductive or 
seasonal cycles, or the transition from 
one life stage to another. This means 
that the timing of experiments is often 
critical. 
 
 Is the test sample of subjects unusual with regards to any 
natural changes in responsiveness? 
 Is the study species known to exhibit diel, or seasonal 
variation in behaviour? 
 Is the timing of experiments standardized to account for 
possible effects due to time of day, photoperiod, or 
season? 
 Are all subjects of the same developmental stage, age and 
reproductive state? If not, how may this affect the 
behaviours observed? 
 
 White suckers had circadian activity patterns, and 
these were more stable in shoals53. 
 Young female guppies were more sensitive to model 
age when copying mate choice54. 
 Gravid female garter snakes were less active and 
sheltered in different landscape features55. 
 Cognitive performance and anxiety responses varied 
with estrous cycle in wild-type female mice56. 
 Reproductive state affected the strength of response to 
social information in sticklebacks57. 
 Zebra finches exhibited circadian rhythmicity of 
activity and singing58. 




Genetic make-up can have profound 
effects on behaviour. There can be 
marked behavioural differences in 
genetic make-up between wild 
populations, and between wild and 
laboratory populations, often 
hampering attempts at broader 
generalization. Sex differences in 
behaviour are well documented. 
 
 Is the test sample of subjects unusual with regards to its 
genetic make-up? 
 Is the test sample of subjects sex-biased? 
 Are the subjects from a specific genetic line? 
 Is the line chosen suitable for examining the behaviour of 
interest? In other words, can artificial selection (or lack 
of natural selection) have affected behavioural 
competency or test performance? 
 If the subjects are wild-type, is the source population 
known? 
 Are inferences explicitly linked to the genetic line or 
study population investigated? 
 
 Fear responses differed between divergent strains of 
Japanese quail60. 
 Genetic strains of mice differed in exploratory 
behaviour and cognitive performance61. 
 Population-level variation in male fruit fly courtship 
songs had a genetic basis62. 
 Males and females differed in their responses to 
predator cues in a strain of mice63. 
 Differences in boldness and anti-predator behaviour 
between wild and domestic zebrafish had a genetic 
basis64. 
 Natural selection via predation drove differences in 
shoaling behaviour between guppy populations65. 
 Different strains of the parasite Toxoplasma gondii had 
differing effects on host behaviour66. 
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 Behavioural syndromes varied between natural 
populations of the delicate skink67. 
 
 
Experience encompasses opportunities 
for individual learning, such as 
participation in earlier experiments. 
Long-lived animals can accumulate 
complex experimental histories in 
research laboratories, which must be 
documented and accounted for. 
 
 Does the test sample of subjects have unusual 
experience? 
 Have subjects participated in similar earlier experiments 
that may affect test performance? 
 Have subjects participated in different experiments that 
may affect test performance? 
 Have subjects experienced husbandry procedures that 
may affect their behaviour? 
 Have subjects accrued experiences in the wild that may 
affect test performance? 
 Have subjects had previous opportunities to learn that 
may overshadow learning in the present study? 
 Are differences in subjects’ experience accounted for? 
 
 Experience of clustered versus dispersed food shaped 
social-foraging behaviour of pollock68. 
 Experience of predator cues affected anti-predator 
behaviour of freshwater snails69. 
 Repeated disturbance of laboratory-housed Poeciliid 
fish increased their boldness70. 
 Tadpoles expressed time-of-day specific anti-predator 
behaviour based on experience71. 
 Learning one solution to an experimental task inhibited 
learning of alternative solutions in chimpanzees72. 
 Magpies recognized individual humans and behaved 
differently towards them73. 
 Defensive behaviour of gopher tortoises varied with 
experience of human disturbance74. 
 Exposure to novel prey reduced wariness towards 
different novel prey in great and coal tits75. 
 Experience of courtship and mating altered personality 
traits in sticklebacks76. 
 
 
The STRANGE framework collates a suite of factors that can affect animal behaviour; the acronym stands for: Social background, Trappability and self-selection, 
Rearing history, Acclimation and habituation, Natural changes in responsiveness, Genetic make-up, and Experience. As noted in the main text, these factors are often 
the focus of well-designed research projects, like the ones listed in this table, or are confounds that have been explicitly controlled for. But problems arise whenever 
samples of study subjects are biased with regards to one or several of the seven categories, and researchers do not account for this. Such unexplained variation can 
significantly impact the interpretation of experimental outcomes, limit the generalizability of findings, complicate comparisons between studies, and hamper 
reproducibility. We therefore recommend that researchers routinely ask themselves: Are my animal subjects unusual – or strange – when compared to the wider 
population for which I wish to make inferences, in any of the seven categories of the STRANGE framework? In this table, we suggest a non-exhaustive set of additional, 
category-specific questions researchers may find useful when trying to mitigate, or detect, STRANGE-related biases when designing their experiments or interpreting 
their findings (for a step-by-step guide to using the STRANGE framework, see Box S1). Note that there is overlap and strong interdependence between some STRANGE 
categories, and that for some of the examples listed here, several may apply. Examples were chosen to cover a broad range of taxa and study contexts, and are listed 
chronologically by publication date. 
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Box S1 | The 3D approach to using the STRANGE framework – 









Include the following text in journal author guidelines or reporting summaries: 
 
(a) Provide detailed information – as applicable – on the origin (incl. trapping 
method), sex, age/developmental stage, mass/body condition, social status, 
personality type, housing conditions (incl. social contacts and enrichment), past 
opportunities for individual and social learning, experimental history, and 
testing protocols (incl. social context), for: 
 the final sample of subjects contributing data to the study; and 
 the subjects that were part of the original sample, but did not 
contribute data (describe reasons for exclusion). 
 
(b) Evaluate scope for sampling biases based on the declarations made under (a), 
especially with regards to subjects’ origin, self-selection behaviour, and prior 
experience. 
 
(c) Describe what efforts (if any) were undertaken to mitigate potential sampling 
biases, especially with regards to sourcing representative subjects (such as using 
a variety of trapping methods), or adjusting experimental protocols to suit non- 




Summarize the declarations in step (2) in two brief statements in the main text 
of research articles: one in the Methods section evaluating the STRANGEness 
of the test sample, and another in the Discussion section explaining how 
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